Clash of Geofutures and the Remaking of Planetary Order: Faultlines underlying Conflicts over Geoengineering Governance by McLaren, D & Corry, O
Clash of Geofutures and the Remaking of







Climate engineering (geoengineering) is rising up the global policy agenda, partly because international divisions pose deep
challenges to collective climate mitigation. However, geoengineering is similarly subject to clashing interests, knowledge-tradi-
tions and geopolitics. Modelling and technical assessments of geoengineering are facilitated by assumptions of a single global
planner (or some as yet unspecified rational governance), but the practicality of international governance remains mostly spec-
ulative. Using evidence gathered from state delegates, climate activists and modellers, we reveal three underlying and clash-
ing ‘geofutures’: an idealised understanding of governable geoengineering that abstracts from technical and political realities;
a situated understanding of geoengineering emphasising power hierarchies in world order; and a pragmatist precautionary
understanding emerging in spaces of negotiation such as UN Environment Assembly (UNEA). Set in the wider historical con-
text of climate politics, the failure to agree even to a study of geoengineering at UNEA indicates underlying obstacles to glo-
bal rules and institutions for geoengineering posed by divergent interests and underlying epistemic and political differences.
Technology assessments should recognise that geoengineering will not be exempt from international fractures; that deploy-
ment of geoengineering through imposition is a serious risk; and that contestations over geofutures pertain, not only to cli-
mate policy, but also the future of planetary order.
Policy Implications
• Assessments of the feasibility and desirability of geoengineering technologies should never be based solely on knowledge
produced under idealised conditions, (e.g. climate modelling or integrated climate and economic modelling).
• Assessments of technologies with global implications should factor in risks and complications generated by the interna-
tional fragmentation of world politics and histories.
• Institutional designs for governing geoengineering should incorporate diverse and situated forms of knowledge as well as
involve broad participation.
• Though they sometimes should be treated separately, an overarching governance framework for both CDR and solar radi-
ation management (SRM) is needed to avoid deterrence of mitigation (’moral hazard’).
• A governance process for geoengineering technologies, separate from climate governance, should be established at the
United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP).
Climate change is a global challenge impacted by, but also
contributing to, international disputes. Emissions of climate-
changing greenhouse gases are still rising, and the chal-
lenge may not be met without the intentional deployment
of planetary technologies that act to reduce or reverse the
effects of climate change – often collectively called ‘geo-
engineering’. Assessments of the feasibility and desirability
of geoengineering techniques (National Academy of
Sciences, 2015; Royal Society, 2009) typically underplay
social and political challenges, in particular those posed by
the inescapably international context in which these climate
interventions are being developed and would be deployed.
Conventionally such interventions are grouped into those
designed to reflect or manage incoming sunlight (‘solar geo-
engineering’ or ‘solar radiation management’ or SRM) and
those to remove carbon dioxide from the atmosphere (‘car-
bon dioxide removal’ or CDR) (Royal Society, 2009). The
models used to evaluate potential geoengineering interven-
tions tend to rely on idealised scenarios and assumptions
about global control, distribution, or aggregation (McLaren,
2018). In earth system models (ESMs) it is effectively pre-
sumed that SRM would be operated or governed by a single
global planner acting to maximise global welfare (Keith and
MacMartin, 2015; Royal Society, 2009). Economic modelling
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presumes that governance can be facilitated by calculation
of a ‘global aggregate utility’ function within which winners
could compensate losers (despite multiple societies valuing
and assessing impacts differently) (Wiertz, 2015). In inte-
grated assessment models (IAMs), the deployment of CDR is
driven by idealised assumptions of global imputed carbon
prices and discounted future costs, with at best simplistic
representations of geographic constraints (Low and Sch€afer,
2020).
Given the starkly multiple and uneven nature of the inter-
national, the key question is: how likely is it that compre-
hensive, functional and just global governance
approximating these assumptions could emerge? The
geopolitical question: could such an intervention be safely
and legitimately deployed? is very different from the scien-
tific question: could geoengineering cool the earth? Further-
more, technologies and social and political regimes co-
evolve (Tyfield, 2012) but given that social life is never sin-
gular (Rosenberg, 2016), each co-production is also subject
to the context of multiple interacting societies. The bur-
geoning geoengineering governance literature (Reynolds,
2019b) engages international relations in a limited fashion
(Corry, 2017b), while dedicated international relations schol-
arship on geoengineering remains sparse (Corry, 2017b; Hor-
ton and Reynolds, 2016) and mostly speculative, often
based on idealised accounts of the international system as
consisting of formally equal and rational state actors who
cooperate or compete (e.g. Lloyd and Oppenheimer, 2014),
sometimes modelled via game theory (Heyen et al., 2019;
Ricke et al., 2013; Urpelainen, 2012). There has so far been
little empirical exploration of the underlying international
dynamics that geoengineering actually engenders.
This paper breaks new ground by presenting evidence
gathered in relation to international negotiations around a
draft resolution specifically on ‘governing geoengineering’
put forward at the 4th UN Environment Assembly (UNEA) in
Nairobi in March 2019. Switzerland, along with diverse but
mainly Southern supporters including Micronesia and Sene-
gal, proposed a resolution1. asking UN Environment to con-
duct a study, advised by an independent panel of experts,
to ascertain the ‘current state of the science’, ‘actors and
activities with regard to research and deployment’, ‘current
knowledge of potential impacts including risks benefits and
uncertainties’ and ‘challenges related to current, and poten-
tial governance frameworks’ for diverse geoengineering
technologies, and draw conclusions on their possible gover-
nance. The preambular material acknowledged existing rele-
vant activities at other UN bodies (the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC); Convention on Biological
Diversity (CBD), the London Protocol, etc.), stressed the
broad distinction between SRM and CDR, and highlighted
concerns over risks to sustainable development and the
environment and the lack of multilateral governance of geo-
engineering. Beforehand the Swiss draft had been deemed
‘open’ and ‘helpful’ and the venue ‘particularly fitting’ by
commentators sympathetic to further research, although
anti-geoengineering campaigners described it as too weak
(Forum for Climate Engineering Assessment, 2019). In the
event, the resolution was opposed in and around a series of
negotiating sessions by a vociferous minority of states, led
by the US and Saudi Arabia.
As we observed these discussions, and interviewed protag-
onists, the main objections raised publicly were that: (1) the
technologies were too diverse to warrant a collective study
(CDR and SRM being taken as more meaningful categories);
(2) the proposed study was premature; and (3) UNEA was not
the appropriate venue, and such an assessment should be left
to ongoing work at the IPCC (Jinnah and Nicholson, 2019;
Reynolds, 2019a). Although a series of concessions were made
in response to all three points we observed continuing oppo-
sition, with further concerns expressed over the role of pre-
caution (Jinnah and Nicholson, 2019), and new objections to
text declaring that geoengineering should not be a substitute
for emissions reductions. Ultimately the opponent states
declared opposition to the idea of a resolution of any kind at
UNEA4 and the draft resolution was withdrawn.
If the questions of diversity, timeliness and venue had
been the only or real issues at stake, the implications of the
collapsed negotiations might be limited. However, we argue
these disagreements should be understood in the context
of underlying clashes over how geoengineering can be
understood, about the nature of world politics (in terms of
structure, leading actors and political logics) in which geo-
engineering might be developed and deployed, and how
decisions might legitimately be made about geoengineering
as a key aspect of a new planetary order (combined geopo-
litical and Earth system arrangements). Such disagreements
have deep ramifications not only for which institutions
should evaluate geoengineering and when, but also for who
can participate, using what sorts of evidence, and with refer-
ence to which values or principles.
Based on interviews with participants at the negotiations
as well as the draft resolution (see endnote 1) and amend-
ments and revisions to it considered during the meeting,
and additional interviews with climate modellers and acti-
vists, we explore how the aspirations and interpretations of
negotiators draw on wider processes in which modellers,
activists and others construct public narratives of geoengi-
neering. First we set out how geoengineering, although it
does not exist in implemented form, takes shape in the
form of diverse ‘future practices’ such as modelling, scenar-
ios, images, resolutions, etc. These embody or represent not
just potential technologies but also necessarily ‘truths’ and
future worlds and procedures. Via analysis of these, the (sur-
prisingly bitter) conflict over a mere study of geoengineer-
ing is put into the context of a wider struggle over
knowledge, justice and strategy in climate politics. We find
that overall the evidence suggests that common assump-
tions in geoengineering research, presupposing comprehen-
sive future governance of geoengineering, are unwarranted
in a world where actors clash over goals as well as underly-
ing interests but also differ on knowledge-politics and
visions of world futures. As one of our interviewees put it:
‘You won’t get geoengineering governance at all, unless it’s
done . . . in a week, without anyone knowing back in capi-
tals’ (NH:1). Assessment of future geoengineering
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technologies should thus factor in not just climate risks but
also those posed by probable imposition via global power
relations.
The UNEA event was the first explicit attempt to begin to
shape a global regime for geoengineering governance, but
it was not the first salvo in the international contestation of
geoengineering – and is unlikely to be the last. Meetings of
the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) (Talberg et al.,
2018), and of the London Convention had previously dis-
cussed particular aspects and forms of geoengineering, and
rehearsed some arguments about possible forms of gover-
nance (Ginzky and Frost, 2014). Moreover, although a
unique event, the Nairobi summit forms part of the ongoing
history of international climate politics in which states with
large fossil reserves and interests, including Russia, China,
Saudi Arabia and the US have had a record of opposing an
effective global carbon regime (Ciplet et al., 2015; Depledge,
2008). Notably, the US, already famous for its exceptionalist
foreign policy tradition (Hughes, 2014; Ruggie, 2009) –
exempting itself from the CBD, for example, has in recent
years both adopted a more antagonistic stance to global cli-
mate policy, and become the world’s leading fossil energy
exporter (Guliyev, 2020). In these respects, the underlying
dynamics revealed here are also likely to persistently shape
future geoengineering debates, and indeed, wider contesta-
tion over the planetary order.
Geoengineering as future practice
Although geoengineering technologies do not yet exist as
technical systems operating at scale to affect the global cli-
mate directly, ‘geoengineering’ exists plentifully as ideas,
experiments, model scenarios, policy and such like, all of
which produce effects in the present by representing possi-
ble futures. In other words geoengineering exists in the
form of ‘future practices’ by which we mean activities that
‘create images, policies or socio-technical artefacts that will
have lasting effect in and for the future’ (Esguerra, 2019, p.
963). Future practices are not simply imaginings but are
underpinned by socio-material objects, ‘future objects’
(Esguerra, 2019, p. 964), including models, scientific appara-
tus, scenarios, pictorial or textual representations, and inter-
governmental treaties or resolutions. They also have a
discursive dimension in the form of narratives and under-
standings of the phenomenon (e.g. a (modelled) +3°C world
with solar geoengineering). Future practices matter because
they not only describe or project possible futures, but also af-
fect the future – they are constitutive ‘techniques of
prospection’ (Mallard and Lakoff, 2012, p. 339), especially
when backed by material, cultural and political resources of
production.
Concerns regarding constitutive or performative effects of
geoengineering future practices have hitherto focused on
how it might deter or delay mitigation efforts (McLaren,
2016b) (also referred to as ‘moral hazard’, Lin, 2013). How-
ever, geoengineering future practices potentially generate a
wider range of effects – elements in what Sheila Jasanoff
(2020, p. 29) calls predictive politics: ‘(s)cientific discoveries
and their applications have opened up the future as a space
of political struggle in countless ways’. For Jasanoff (2020, p.
41), ‘the dynamics of the move from the politics of the
world-as-it-is to that of worlds-yet-to-come demand a shar-
per awareness of the moves being made in this transition’.
We categorise such moves in three groups.
First, (and most obviously) future practices produce truth-
claims about what geoengineering could be or do. We call
this truth-making work in that it not only puts forward
claims about what geoengineering and the climate system
is like, but thereby also establishes a ‘truth regime’ that
allots epistemological authority to particular actors and
methods, that in turn circumscribe the range and types of
climate technologies ‘on offer’ (Stoddard and Collins, 2016).
Second, future practices implicitly or explicitly produce
and rely on presumptions about the wider world that geo-
engineering might enter. To discuss or study geoengineer-
ing involves depicting, modelling, imagining, abstracting
from or planning for, not just technical devices, but future
worlds surrounding them. This relates not just to climate
trends, but also to political and social relations, dynamics
and expectations, and underlying ontological understand-
ings of what exists, for example, in temporal and spatial
terms. In line with Beck and Mahony (2018), we call this
world-making work.
Third, future practices also generate understandings and
expectations relating to how and where decisions on
whether or how to implement geoengineering will be made,
and who influences – or has a voice in – them. As Hajer
(2003, p. 88) points out, although normally thought of as
the result of politics, ‘public policy often creates a public
domain’ including specific political identities – we only find
out what we want and who we are when a proposition is
put up about the future. Policy formulation is but one type
of future practice, that has this, what we term, action-mak-
ing function, particularly critical to the legitimacy of imag-
ined future geoengineering.
Applying an internationalised version of cultural political
economy, we emphasise the many implications of multiple
coexisting societies, as a critical part of the ways in which
social imaginaries and political economic regimes coproduce
societal orders (Groves, 2014; Markusson et al., 2018). In
such processes different versions of truth, world and action-
making are interwoven generating different configurations
of what we term ‘geofutures’: anticipatory integrated, per-
formed versions of what geoengineering is, what criteria to
evaluate it against, what governance it warrants and how
action might be taken. Even outside international fora, such
processes are affected by the coexistence of multiple,
uneven societies. But studying geoengineering future
objects at the UN Environment Assembly in Nairobi, we
focus on a context where the effects of the international are
particularly unavoidable.
We identify three main geofutures in circulation around
the time of the Nairobi negotiations: the ‘idealised’, ‘situated’
and ‘pragmatist’. Not all actors adopted a single, pure geofu-
ture, but identifying ideal-types illuminates the key cleav-
ages. It follows from this that we cannot pre-define
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‘geoengineering’ to only include certain types of technology,
since such boundary work (Gieryn, 1983) is part of each con-
tested geofuture. We ask instead how the UN resolution
process exposed ongoing socio-technical struggles over defi-
nitions of geoengineering, with different countries stressing
different access to geoengineering science, valuing different
forms of knowledge and highlighting different risks (from
famine to stranded fossil assets).
Gathering future objects
We gathered diplomatic, scientific and activist future objects,
using literature reviews, observation and deliberative inter-
views to identify overall patterns and divisions underlying
the failure of the resolution to be passed. A series of semi-
structured interviews were undertaken at the UNEA meeting
in Kenya; and at a school on climate justice in Nigeria con-
vened by a leading geoengineering critic (the Health of
Mother Earth Foundation), in July 2019; supplemented with
interviews using telephone or online video calling tech-
niques. In total 29 individuals in three groups were inter-
viewed about how they understand ‘geoengineering’ and
regarding diverse questions arising from the draft resolution:
eight members of government delegations to the UNEA
meeting (including both Northern and Southern countries, a
majority of the countries that attended the geoengineering
resolution informal meetings, and all those most vocal dur-
ing negotiations); 15 civic society representatives (at UNEA,
and at the HOMEF School), predominantly (11/15) with indi-
viduals from the global South (including a mix of declared
opponents of geoengineering, and those undecided but
interested in the topic); and six climate/geoengineering
modellers (all from the global North, but representing all
the major research groups in this area, undertaken in July
and August 2019). Interviewees in the first two groups were
solicited within the relevant meetings, while interviews with
modellers were secured by direct outreach. The gender and
ethnic mix of the different groups of interviewees is diverse.
Government delegates were ethnically very diverse,
although around three-quarters male. Civic society represen-
tatives were almost exclusively people of colour, with
around one-third women. Modellers were all white, but half
were women. All respondents gave their prior informed con-
sent to the interviews, under an assumption that their
responses would not be attributed to them, unless they vol-
unteered otherwise. The Swiss proposal provided a focus for
the interviews conducted in Nairobi. In the other interviews
aspirations and prospects for governance of geoengineering
were discussed in more general terms. In what follows, quo-
tations are labelled with a two letter identifier: in each case
the first letter refers to the group (C = civil society;
M = modeller; N = negotiator) and the second codes anony-
mously for the different informants.
Three clashing geofutures
In this section we examine how our diverse respondents
engaged with geoengineering and its potential regulation
and we outline three ideal-typical positions (summarised in
Table 1). First, the idealised geofuture is constructed primar-
ily through reductionist and rationalist truth-making revolv-
ing around modelling science. This presents geoengineering
as an instrumental technological means to alleviate climate
harms, reduce the costs of climate action and enhance dis-
tributive justice, but also relies on simplified expectations of
a global actor (or multilateral governance) acting on behalf
of a global constituency. We then describe a contrasting sit-
uated geofuture in which geoengineering is treated as inevi-
tably part of multiple cultural, political and economic
relations. This links the technology to emissions histories
and material examples and patterns of exploitation, corrup-
tion and conflict, typically presenting geoengineering not as
climate governance but as an imposition of power, likely to
sustain fossil extractivism – for some even representing a
new dimension of colonialism. Finally, a pragmatist geofu-
ture rooted in a complex, multi-level and negotiated under-
standing of the world represents geoengineering as a
signifier of failure to address the climate challenge through
effective mitigation. From this position, geoengineering mer-
its exploration, but with a precautionary stance both in
terms of its material effects and its political implications.
Here procedural justice is important, and governance is nec-
essary to avoid unaccountable or illegitimate geoengineer-
ing and unwanted risks such as ‘termination shock’.
The idealised geofuture
In the idealised geofuture shared by many of the modellers
and some of the state delegates interviewed, CDR and SRM
technologies are assessed largely abstracted from social,
political, legal and international contexts, obviating the need
for the collective term ‘geoengineering’. Once ‘demon-
strated’ against scientific or technical criteria, each discrete
technology could be inserted by policy makers into the
world to reduce ‘climate risks’ (also understood separately
from wider societal and historical factors). ‘Governance’ may
be desirable but is essentially exogenous to the technology.
The future practice that facilitates this idealised view best
is modelling – in some cases treated as the sole mode of
reliable and policy-relevant truth-making (Heymann and
Dahan Dalmedico, 2019). UNEA delegates arguing that the
resolution would undermine geoengineering assessment at
the IPCC referenced the importance of good modelling: ‘The
IPCC is where the science base should be pursued . . . Mod-
elling is good at the IPCC’ (NH:2). Even though the idealised
nature of such knowledge is acknowledged, its policy-rele-
vance is taken for granted: ‘Modelling is critical to under-
standing . . . and gives information to policy makers that
allows them to act accordingly’ (MD:1). Another modeller
considers that ‘Geoengineering [modelling] work focused on
1.5 or 2 degrees [C] is inherently policy relevant’ (ME:1).
Opponents of the UNEA study pointed to ongoing assess-
ment by the IPCC which:
has the right mechanisms for science to inform
governance: governments ask scientists to go and
© 2021 The Authors. Global Policy published by Durham University and John Wiley & Sons Ltd. Global Policy (2021)
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do research, get expert review, then review by gov-
ernments and publics, followed by negotiation of
the [summary for policy-makers]. Repeated as
needed to ‘keep up with the science’. This works
for us. (NH:3)
IPCC processes rely on peer-reviewed publications, which
offer a filtered and idealised set of results. Yet opponents of
the resolution objected to the ‘narrow remit of UNEP on the
environment’ and argued ‘The IPCC bases its work on 3,000
scientists and is approved by governments’ (NG:1). Such
arguments were made even while acknowledging that on
geoengineering, the IPCC would be reliant on just a few
models and modellers (NH:4) and that a UNEA study would
be broader in scope and methods.
Modelling also implicitly involves world-making and the
idealised position projects a rational, technocratic policy
making environment. One modeller explicitly suggested a
technocratic governance model, using the Federal Reserve
as an analogue ‘fiscal policy is decided politically, much else
is delegated as “technical”’ (MB:1). In such a model, mod-
elling would gain ‘an entirely new use’ as ‘operational, adap-
tive forecasting’ (MB:2) despite difficulties in attributing
causes. Modelling assumptions also tend to reflect (and rein-
force) ‘the view that solar geoengineering could or will be
used in the global general interest’ (MF:2). Almost all mod-
elling ‘implies global top-down governance’ (MF:3). Similarly,
the geoengineering model intercomparison project (geoMIP)
‘doesn’t deal with justice, but implies a single global con-
troller’ (MB:3). The complications of the international feature
only weakly in the idealised geofuture.
In practice many state representatives as well as most
modellers recognised serious uncertainties, particularly in
attributing actual outcomes to geoengineering interventions
(especially SRM) and thus in controlling it. ‘We wouldn’t
know the full consequences of [solar geoengineering] even
several years after deployment’ (MF:1), and therefore could
not fine-tune and control it. ‘Models cannot attribute effects
in practice’, so could not realistically be used for governance
(MG:1). As a result, any geoengineering governance ‘would
need a liability regime, because people will fight over attri-
bution’ (MD:2). Dependent on a liability or insurance regime,
the ‘discrete technology’ view begins to break down (Horton
and Keith, 2019).
Even in the multilateral setting of UNEA, reliance on mod-
elling allows concerns regarding the political fragmentation
of the world to be suspended. The idealised model-based
assessment typically treats questions of justice as outside its
remit, and potentially inappropriate in objective scientific
research. Modellers suggested that in modelling: ‘why inter-
ventions are important is incidental’ (MF:4), and: ‘Modelling
is not really intended to target justice . . . I don’t want to
get into that’ (MD:3). Nonetheless some argued that their
work suggested conclusions for justice in similarly simplified
forms: ‘It would be possible to design a global deployment
that benefited most regions in a distributionally just way’
(MF:5). Scenarios in which SRM is used to ‘shave’ the peak
off global temperatures ‘imply that differential regional
impacts or precipitation over-compensation won’t be an
issue’ (MA:2) – a claim echoed in the literature (Horton and
Keith, 2016; Irvine et al., 2019). One modeller even saw
‘transgenerational equity and justice . . . embodied in doing
geoengineering modelling’, presenting the geoengineering
options they modelled as ‘solutions that are egalitarian,
rather than depending on the wealth of countries’ (MA:3).
This respondent echoed complaints that consideration of
geoengineering was being held back by rich world con-
cerns:
we need to hear from those vulnerable to climate
change . . . not from the safety of the Finnish for-
ests . . . without a doubt, the developing world
would see SRM as a reasonable thing to be consid-
ered against alternatives of adaptation and suffer-
ing. (MA:4)
This matters because modelling science is expected to
inform – if not lead – policy at a multilateral level. One
modeller observes that one might ‘seek a way to get global
agreement over a geoengineering schema by tailoring it in
the model and in the real world to provide wriggle-room
against climate temperature targets’ (MB:4). Several respon-
dents argue that ‘overshoot’ scenarios (in which carbon bud-
gets and temperature targets are breached and SRM used)
would ‘inform meaningful debate’ (MA:5, MC:1). Thus, mod-
elling science and the global politics are acknowledged as
co-constitutive of each other, though clearly with the truth-
making leading the world-making.
At the same time the primary context for the selection
of model scenarios and the material in published papers is
academic incentives and review criteria rather than political
or ethical considerations. Reviewing of papers in disci-
plinary scientific journals gives ‘no incentives to embed jus-
tice or similar issues’ (MF:6) while ‘defensibility of technical
and policy options is of little relevance’ (MA:6). In pub-
lished papers, simulations are often selected from multiple
model runs to provide the best illustration of the findings
(ME:2). In describing some modelling that included interac-
tions this modeller explained the criteria for choosing what
to publish:
We had to choose one scenario to publish . . . so con-
sidered what was most palatable to reviewers, most
impactful, defensible in assumptions . . . this was an
invited piece on solar geoengineering, so we weren’t
going to say that CDR could do it all. (ME:3)
It is in this context that the IPCC – with its dependence
on modelling studies – would guide policy.
Thus, in the idealised geofuture modelling and other sci-
entific future objects delimit what ‘geoengineering’ is in
terms of its mechanisms, efficacy and legitimacy. Although
it considers political contexts as incidental to its own truth-
making, the same knowledge is considered able to provide
a basis for policy decisions. This is linked to an underlying
(and highly stylised) belief about knowledge leading rational
action in a context of global governance, particularly via the
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processes of review and consultation in the IPCC. Moreover,
in the idealised view, research is categorically separate from
deployment, and there is therefore little need for gover-
nance of research, while governance of deployment is an
issue that can wait.
The situated geofuture
By contrast, some state representatives and most civil soci-
ety respondents promoted a very different geofuture rooted
in an understanding of geoengineering situated in a world
structured by a long history of unevenly distributed benefits
and power. Issues such as climate outcomes, carbon bal-
ance, environmental side effects and technical plausibility
are not ignored in evaluating geoengineering, but these are
interpreted within a situated frame of reference, and the
status of knowledge produced from experiments or models
is not automatically privileged nor assumed to be neutral.
This closely echoes Haraway’s (1988) definition of ‘situated
knowledge’. Situated respondents were typically, but not
exclusively, from the global South, and tended to emphasise
the political context, often also raising cultural or spiritual
concerns, in ways Northern respondents tended not to.
A key source of knowledge is the historical legacy of pre-
vious technological and geopolitical developments. From a
southern situated position, the spectre of colonialism is
never far from the debate. Geoengineering is ‘colonising the
skies,’ (CH:1) and putting ‘the developing world back at the
mercy of the rich world,’ (CG:1). One state delegate contex-
tualised their demands to improve geoengineering knowl-
edge, as ‘not about “capacity building” . . . “Capacity
building” is nothing, just a new way to keep Africa behind.
Or a way to make others think the same way you do, rather
than letting them think for themselves’ (NF:2).
Where the idealised position foregrounds truth-making
practices over world-making, in the situated geofuture that
hierarchy is reversed. Geoengineering is not a discrete tech-
nological apparatus but a feature of the world-system and
its continuation. Geoengineering ‘allows those whose
actions are causing the problem to continue . . . and to
profit’ (CH:2); ‘addresses only the symptoms of the problem’
(CF:1); and could ‘make things worse – entrench the fossil
fuel economy, providing it continued power and legitimacy’
(CE:1). Respondents raised multiple justice-based concerns
that geoengineering might be imposed without consent
(CM), involve control over patents (CC), ignore indigenous
knowledge (CG), and if relied upon instead of adaptation,
could increase the risks of sea-level rise for the poorest (CB);
concerns exacerbated by the fear that decisions would be
made by corrupt, extractivist governments.
While the idealised global actor might be imagined to
deploy geoengineering to save the vulnerable South, here
the technologies are firmly positioned as Northern in terms
of research, potential deployment and the interests that it
would serve. Research and deployment are inextricably
interlinked, and both demand governance to constrain
them. Moreover, the technologies are understood in the
context of previous global governmental regimes. Like
structural adjustment programs (administered by ‘global’
institutions such as the IMF), if geoengineering were to be
deployed, its withdrawal or maintenance ‘will be used as a
threat to enforce behaviour . . . this would be totally unac-
ceptable in African society – we will not tolerate more exter-
nal control . . . colonialism left cross-generational trauma.
Geoengineering is yet another “white man’s thing”’ (CC:1).
The perceived control provided by geoengineering exacer-
bates geopolitical imbalance: ‘It’s warfare at another level
. . . motivated by fear of “the other” and the desire to be
able to threaten them,’ (CC:2) and ‘hands control over the
global thermostat to the rich, elite, North’ (CF:2).
The mitigation deterrence problem is also cast differently.
From the situated position geoengineering threatens to
enable powerful interests to avoid action to halt fossil ex-
traction, making it in the eyes of one activist: ‘a crime
against future generations’ (CH:3). In terms of action-making
work therefore, geoengineering has to be internationally
regulated, in part because governments cannot be assumed
to represent vulnerable populations. For instance: ‘SRM
would be acceptable in Nigeria because it would allow oil
exploitation to continue’ (CJ:1) and the ‘government would
accept [geoengineering] “hook line and sinker” as long as it
came with financial incentives’ (CG:2). Corrupt politicians
‘don’t want to understand . . . as long as it’s giving revenue,
making them richer . . . Governments will keep looting’
(CK:1). The situated Southern political context thus places
hopes for climate justice not on Northern technocratic inter-
ventions but on transformation of the systems responsible
for the climate problem and the extractivism that underpins
it.
Whereas in the idealised geofuture uncertainties are
something to be addressed by scientific expertise, for the
situated, knowledge about geoengineering based on mod-
elling alone is perceived as potentially biased. Civic society
respondents universally argued for broad participation in
governance, including both multilateral involvement of
countries, broad involvement of publics and diversity in
forms of knowledge: ‘hearing everyone’s stories is funda-
mental to addressing climate change’ (CH:4). Practicing that
diversity, Southern NGO respondents moved matter-of-factly
between scientific, political and spiritual language, with fre-
quent calls for respect for indigenous knowledge and
approaches. In talking of the problems arising in using for-
ests to supply biomass for CDR, one noted: ‘Forests are not
just where people live today, but also the abode of our
ancestors . . . who don’t die, but continue in nature when
they return to the earth’ (CL:2). Another argued that: ‘We
should work towards ensuring that indigenous beliefs are
not totally eroded, so that the global South can also con-
tribute [solutions] . . . modernisation is eroding the indige-
nous checks and balances protecting our resources’ (CA:1).
Such views were reflected by some government dele-
gates, who sought ‘inclusive processes of participation for
diverse actors, diverse knowledges and across different
dimensions of the problem’ (ND:3); and argued that without
broad-based information on possible impacts they would be
left: ‘unable to exercise influence and (without) rights to
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participate’ (NE:10). The relative openness of UNEA to
diverse knowledges and stakeholders was seen as important
in this respect.
Not all our Southern respondents were categorically
opposed to geoengineering, but even those open to consid-
ering it argued for ‘strict regulation and broad outreach’
(CJ:2). Many civil society respondents thought governance
should be preemptive, in the form of a ban, imposed by the
United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), the CBD or UNEA.
There was little sympathy for governance under the
UNFCCC, nor for assessment by the IPCC. Views extended to
very harsh prescriptions: ‘the Security Council might be the
right place [for governance] . . . I’d advocate a “total ban
and criminalization”, because geo-engineering is “terrorism
in the making”’ (CC:3). Similarly, ‘geoengineering should be
banned by the CBD and classed as ecocide’ (CH:5). Not all
went so far, one advocating instead: ‘a binding independent
international instrument on geoengineering . . . with trans-
parent reporting . . . [and] a moratorium on deployment
until there is a whole governance system’ (CM:2). For situ-
ated respondents, both SRM and CDR should be subject to
‘a multi-national, multi-interest framework to assess potential
utilisation, impacts and governance’ (CL:3); something ‘par-
ticipative’ (CG:3) and ‘collective’ (CK:2), and involving ‘prior
informed consent . . . respecting rights to self-determination
and sovereignty over resources’ (CM:3).
Interestingly, most modellers’ expectations of real-world
deployment of geoengineering echo the situated narrative
more than idealised modelling. For one, the speed of SRM
makes it likely to be considered as climate impacts intensify,
but winning intergovernmental agreement would likely
require ‘tying it up in ongoing diplomacy – trade, military
cooperation etc.’ (MB:6). Others noted that ‘unilateral efforts
would likely be suppressed, by trade sanctions or military
threats’ (MC:2), or ‘would risk political crisis in a world of
increasing nationalist division’ (MG:2), yet still expect ‘incre-
mental, unilateral, ungoverned geoengineering’ driven by
local impacts (ME:4) or even ‘as a tool of political diplomacy
. . . countries might deploy SRM as a way to extract justice
from the international community, even deliberately aiming
to negatively affect perceived climate villains’ (MA:7).
Thus, in the situated geofuture ‘geoengineering’ is not
simply a set of devices but an integrated part of a world-his-
torical system, best understood, not just through climate
modelling and economic theory but through disciplines of
history, political economy and even religion. The notion of
‘governance’ envisaged by situated future practices is more
comprehensive, going beyond state level agreements to
depend effectively on a transformational process of reduc-
ing power imbalances and addressing justice beyond only
impact attribution and cost distribution.
The pragmatist geofuture
If the idealised geofuture foregrounds truth-making and the
situated prioritises world-making, the pragmatist focuses on
action-making, moving issues of uncertainty and precaution
centre-stage in a multi-level world of complexity and
uncertainty, where truth is subject to interpretation and
negotiation. Those exhibiting this position (including many
negotiators) take a precautionary stance regarding both the
material and political side-effects of geoengineering, and
treat models as merely one means of inquiry about the
future. They recognise the value of more situated assess-
ment, not just the idealised view of the IPCC, and apply a
pragmatic view of governance as potentially either con-
straining or enabling for technologies. Questions of fairness
are part of their assessments, albeit most strongly in relation
to procedural questions.
Where the other geofutures consider climate science
somehow capable of precision (either in tailoring geoengi-
neering or controlling it for vested interests) the pragmatist
understands science as itself also a source of risk. Those
countries supportive of a UNEA assessment of geoengineer-
ing highlighted uncertainties about side-effects, and the
risks of geoengineering undermining mitigation. Geoengi-
neering technology:
must be treated with precaution regarding potential
negative impacts on the environment or other peo-
ples. If it’s possible to use safely . . . and without
undermining emissions reduction, then it would be
OK. But it shouldn’t be used as a substitute. (NF:3)
For another state delegate SRM is ‘deeply concerning’ but
the uncertainties about the stability of the climate system
mean that . . . ‘[still] we are not ready to reject it entirely’
(NE:1).
A key pragmatist aim at UNEA was to build on (or not
undermine) existing precautionary governance. One South-
ern delegate highlighted a choice between upholding pre-
caution, and relaxing control, arguing in favour of
‘governance to strengthen the precautionary principle, to
confirm the CBD decisions’ (ND:1). Another delegate care-
fully separated their own opinion from their official, more
neutral, line: ‘Personally, I see geoengineering (especially
SRM/Stratospheric Aerosol Injection (SAI) as “very scary” and
it should be governed on a precautionary basis’ (NC:1).
This emphasis on uncertainty and risk emanating from the
scientific knowledge-production means that action-making
matters. Research might be usefully conducted, but is not
inevitably separate from the risks of potential deployment.
Supporters of the resolution called for ‘norms and regulations,
not just voluntary projects . . . It’s like the human rights
regime. The declaration [the Universal Declaration on Human
Rights (UDHR)] isn’t enough, it needs regulation to implement
it’ (NB:1). Governance is needed ‘because of the likelihood of
transboundary impacts, and worries about geoengineering as
a security issue’. This applies to CDR at scale as well as SRM:
‘It’s also of international significance if a country tries to sub-
stitute CDR for emissions reductions’ (NB:2).
In the pragmatist geofuture the multiplicity of the interna-
tional is neither assumed away nor reduced to ‘Northern
domination’. Rather, it demands inclusion of diverse actors
in action-making: ‘With a magic wand, I’d . . . emphasise
governance in a UNEA report. The process should also
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involve civil society. We share the same planet, and should
work together for the benefits of the environment’ (NF:4).
Discriminating governance of geoengineering (and research
into it) is understood pragmatically as needed both: ‘to con-
strain geoengineering in the face of side effects or irre-
versible effects . . . [or to] constrain unilateral use by a large
power, which could trigger wider conflicts between nuclear-
armed states’ (NE:2), and ‘alternatively to enable it in the
face of imminent climate crisis’ (NE:3) or to avoid the risk
that, like essential drugs, without global governance ‘tech-
niques like SRM will get into private hands, and thus be less
accessible in case of need’ (NE:4). For other delegates, while
CDR was seen to merit a precautionary approach, other geo-
engineering approaches might be ‘ruled out following
assessment’ (NB:3).
For pragmatists, UNEP/UNEA was a far preferable venue
because of its broader and more situated remit and repre-
sentation. ‘Our country counts on UNEP for information and
capacity building. UNEP is an international forum that
“brings together a wide variety of views” and makes infor-
mation more “useful”’ (NE:5). ‘We feel “better protected or
represented” by UNEP than by IPCC’ (NE:7). Other bodies
favoured in the idealised position, like the US National Aca-
demies of Science, are problematic because they are ‘not
concerned with issues and impacts from the perspective of
[countries like ours]’ who have ‘no chance to influence what
is considered’ (NE:6). Moreover, geoengineering is ‘not yet a
political football’ (to be traded off against other issues) –
‘UNEA doesn’t tend to do that, unlike the UNFCCC’ (NE:8).
Again it is telling to compare these comments with mod-
ellers’ speculations on likely real-world outcomes, which sug-
gest exactly such a politicised form.
In Nairobi, both supporters and opponents of the resolu-
tion expressed concerns about the risk of politicisation of
governance discussions, with pragmatists seeing a move to
the UNFCCC as an attempt to avoid regulation:
Sending the issue to the IPCC would mean putting
it in a voluntary, unregulated space . . . any negoti-
ation would then happen under the UNFCCC . . .
The desire of some parties to push this to the IPCC
is a delaying tactic and reflects a desire to keep
their hands free from restraint. (NB:4)
One vocal Southern supporter of the resolution said ‘we
are very concerned about power relations and the domi-
nance of rich [countries]. The IPCC is science-based, about
climate, not about the technology. UNEA is the right place
to assess technology, IPCC is not’ (NF:5).
Like the situated geofuture, the pragmatist position also
draws on historical experience, in this case that of global
governance: ‘What happened with Hydrochlorofluorocarbons
(HCFCs) is a good example. Once the IPCC got hold of them
it needed the Kigali amendment to accelerate progress’
(NF:6). Another delegate recognised concerns about inter-
ests, noting the influence of tobacco firms on the World
Health Organisation: ‘NGOs have experience of abuse of
science in the multilateral system – we can understand
where they are coming from . . . The IPCC is the best we
have for science-based governance, but it might be vulnera-
ble to interests’ (NB:5).
Several delegates perceived vested interests behind argu-
ments for leaving geoengineering assessment to the IPCC.
Such arguments serve the interests of ‘the promoters of
technologies . . . [and] those climate scientists who want to
test their models and hypotheses’ (ND:2), said one. For
another, they served ‘the interests of the fossil fuel industry
. . . they don’t want governance. On the other hand we [an
African nation] want to go as quickly and comprehensively
as possible’ (NF:7). Another noted that while they could not
‘afford to support work at the peer-reviewed level . . . there
are strong interest groups paying for “science” to validate
their positions’, arguing that IPCC has been ‘politicised by
the decision makers’ (NE:9).
Thus the pragmatist geofuture is one in which CDR and
SRM are inseparable from scientific and global governance
uncertainties, and have to be considered as possible inter-
ventions in a difficult context, where vested interests and
governance dilemmas hamper the desirable prospect of
inclusive and transparent precautionary governance.
Discussion
Understanding the distinctive geofutures exposes deeper
differences behind the face-value reasons given for dis-
agreement at UNEA (venue, definitions and timing). Here
we discuss three broad implications all of which undergird
our overall conclusion that there is little evidentiary basis
for assessing geoengineering technology as if broad con-
sensual global governance were a given or even likely.
First, diplomatic disagreements over venue (and timing
and definition) reflect contextualised differences in con-
ceptions of truth, worlds and power – competing geofu-
tures – not simply disagreements over evidence or
procedure within a shared social imaginary. Second, the
idealised and categorised knowledge (including definitions)
created by the dominant social imaginaries of science and
economics provides insufficient (and possibly misleading)
guidance for negotiating the contextual geopolitics of cli-
mate intervention. And third, negotiating governance in
this epistemically, ontologically and ideologically fractured
space – already difficult to predict – is not a question of
waiting for the right time (and place) – indeed it will
likely become even more difficult as climate impacts in
the material world grow because such impacts may exac-
erbate these disagreements, even as they undermine insti-
tutions of cooperation.
It’s not the venue – disagreement is fundamentally
situated
The question of venue became the central flashpoint of dis-
agreement, with idealised support for assessment to be left
to the IPCC. According to one delegate, those wishing to
support involvement of Southern interests ‘should simply
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start an independent process to engage and develop South-
ern capacity’ not bring a resolution to UNEA (NH:6).
However, such arguments should not be taken purely at
face value. To express concern that the IPCC might be ‘dis-
tracted’ by a UNEA assessment might seem hypocritical
coming from countries like the US and Saudi Arabia, which
had previously failed to welcome the IPCC 1.5 special report.
Moreover, even if the call to move assessment to the IPCC
were well-intentioned, it would reduce the likelihood of gov-
ernance, as well as slowing the process. Opponents of the
UNEA resolution objected not only because it presumed ‘a
particular venue and scope’ but also ‘a precautionary
approach, and specific implications for mitigation’ (NH:7).
Arguably they feared that a precautionary approach at
UNEA would constrain use of geoengineering techniques
(especially as a substitute for mitigation). Yet language on
precaution is longstanding and common across UN bodies,
so there is no guarantee that a shift of venue would result
in a less precautionary approach (contra to Jinnah and
Nicholson, 2019). While some opponents expressed a fear
that geoengineering might be unduly constrained as a
response to unavoidable climate change (NH), others were
explicitly keen to keep geoengineering available as an alter-
native to conventional emissions mitigation. One opposed
delegate even stated, when asked hypothetically about risks
of geoengineering replacing greenhouse gas emissions cuts:
that’s what we want [We have] no view on SRM
officially – (. . .) and it’s OK to be careful. But we
are keen to enable CDR/CCS (. . .) We have no wor-
ries about mitigation deterrence. Our view is that
we can continue using fossil fuels for growth and
sustainability because we can use geoengineering
and CCS to fight the emissions. (NG:2)
The objectivist (idealised) image of asymmetrically
informed actors, with (perhaps divergent) interests negotiat-
ing in good-faith in multilateral venues fails to capture such
contextualised differences in interests and views on power
and justice, which in turn subtend disagreements over
knowledge and procedure (expressed as disputes over
venue/timing). Situated and pragmatist perspectives alike
critiqued the role of interests at the IPCC. And it is in the sit-
uated geofuture that mitigation deterrence emerges as an
expectation rooted in world histories and extractivism,
rather than as a product of inadequate knowledge or
rational actors ‘gaming’ each other for individual benefit.
Even in the pragmatist geofuture risk of mitigation deter-
rence (read through diplomatic histories) becomes material,
demanding a precautionary approach.
More generally, caution over – or downright opposition to
– geoengineering arises not primarily in scientific evidence or
modelled projections (although both those forms of future
objects play important roles) but in conceptions of how the
world works and the particular actor’s position in it. In partic-
ular, opposition arises in perceptions of the world as divided,
as contested, and in positions that take the perspective of
the disadvantaged and vulnerable. For example, we found
southern objections to geoengineering based on the under-
standing that it would act to sustain existing injustices (e.g.
locally polluting oil extraction in collusion with armed mili-
tias); while modellers look instead at the theoretical potential
for geoengineering to reduce the injustice in climate impacts.
Given the world-view inherent in the situated position, it
becomes inconceivable – even if it were technically plausible
– that a geoengineering deployment configuration would be
designed to maximise justice in ways the modellers might
suggest. This concerns side effects of large-scale CDR (de-
mands for land or minerals, energy or CO2 storage spaces),
and the potential for modulated and tailored SRM interven-
tions to address temperature ‘overshoot’.
This is not to argue that the privileged enjoy the luxury of
abstraction, and therefore have developed an objective per-
spective, while the global South adopts a subjective situated
geofuture through struggle. Instead we see the privileged posi-
tion – despite its imagined abstraction – as equally perspective-
dependent and embedded in existing social relations. ‘Rule
makers’ and ‘rule takers’ occupy very different positions. Groups
that fear imposition of geoengineering decisions, whether their
fear is of geoengineering measures imposed when they aren’t
wanted, or of being unable to access geoengineering if they
did want it, want governance developed (and soon). Those who
see an interest in and power to impose geoengineering deci-
sions – among the ‘makers’ of global power relations (including
some elites in Global South countries) – currently resist the
development of governance, favouring an ad hoc form of gov-
ernance, seeing themselves as the actors to legitimately deliver
outcomes informed by idealised knowledge. In a situated
understanding, it is the US and their allies that might undertake
uni- or mini-lateral SRM, not the poor countries of the global
South [regardless of what discourse on ‘rogue geoengineers’
might suggest (The Economist, 2019)].
It’s not the definitions – the idealised position is too
flimsy to sustain governance
On the face of it, definitions and categorisation were
another fault-line in Nairobi, with many arguing that SRM
and CDR should be treated distinctively (e.g. NG:2 in the
preceding section). Another resolution opponent argued
that: ‘There is no clarity on what counts as geoengineering
. . . we fear a restrictive effect of a list of techniques that
might include things of interest to [my Government]’ (NA:2).
That material differences between CDR and SRM might
merit different treatment is partly a reflection of an Idealised
position – in contrast to a situated position from which the
political similarities suggest the two carry similar risks. In sit-
uated and pragmatist geofutures, the potential for near-term
mitigation deterrence, and the side-effects of large-scale
CDR, are understood as likely injustices or risk-transfers. And
when we consider the way CDR is treated as a future object
in the contending geofutures, it seems impossible to con-
clude that its separation from SRM would have ensured the
resolution’s success, or indeed, even have proved possible.
Even when CDR was textually clearly separated from SRM
in the revised draft, the opponents of the resolution still did
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not concede the point. In addition while they at times advo-
cated separation, at other stages they sought to bracket not
only SRM and CDR together, but to group them also with
fossil carbon capture storage (CCS) and other forms of miti-
gation as ‘climate measures’, always in service of an argu-
ment to avoid precautionary governance. Much CDR and
CCS is already effectively authorised and enabled within
UNFCCC agreements, and could be largely enabled at a
national scale. It is the international implications, such as
land-grabs for biomass, impacts on oceans, and the risks of
mitigation deterrence, that generate demands for multilat-
eral precautionary governance of such techniques (in con-
trast with suggestions like those of Bellamy and Geden
(2019) for bottom-up governance based in local characteris-
tics). This does not necessarily mean that the opponents of
the resolution plan to implement CDR, which instead func-
tions as a promise of future action that facilitates continued
fossil extraction and use (as Markusson et al., 2017 found for
CCS).
More generally, the idealised geofuture sees geoengineer-
ing as one of a series of interventions in the climate, under-
stood primarily through modelling, and governed in the
global interest, tailored and modulated to deliver not only
climate stabilisation but also some level of distributive jus-
tice for those most affected by climate change. As we have
seen, this is not compatible with a situated position in the
world, nor indeed a pragmatist one. It is not just that the
attribution problems of SRM – identified by modellers –
might make the technique politically impossible, but that
attribution is just one of a host of problems and difficulties
related to the international, such as: coordinating action,
interpreting other actors’ intentions, having diverging inter-
ests and knowledges, etc. All these make inclulsive collective
governance of geoengineering highly implausible, especially
because uneven international politics in this case revolves
around predictions and futures. Jasanoff (2020, p. 30) puts it
starkly: ‘persuading people to opt for any vision of a future
world, the things to come (. . .) requires a leap into a fictive,
unrealized landscape of dreams rather than one of tangible
reality’.
Modelling work, however, is an imperfect foundation for
governance decisions, and some of the scientists we inter-
viewed noted ways in which idealised future practices of
SRM geoengineering might undermine other future prac-
tices. One highlighted that. ‘solar geoengineering looks far
too good in IAMs [integrated assessment models]’ – it
appears to work perfectly (MF:7), and the framing of the
problem as cost-optimisation in IAMs is ‘inappropriate for
solar geoengineering’ (MF:8). The implication here is that
mitigation deterrence could be a product not of moral laxity
but of the truth-making of the models. Experience with CDR
in IAMs bears this out, with bio-energy carbon capture and
storage (BECCS) preferentially modelled simply because of
the ease of including it, and promises of CDR consistently
displacing near-term mitigation because of cost-optimisation
and discounting principles (Bednar et al., 2019; Realmonte
et al., 2019). The scientist’s concerns suggest that similar fail-
ings might apply to SRM: although ‘solar geoengineering
hasn’t been used much by those arguing against emission
cuts . . . that is coming’ (MF:9).
Among modellers and negotiators, models are too often
treated or presented as truth-making tools, even when so sim-
plified or abstract that their policy relevance is negligible. Most
modellers acknowledged both that just and governable sce-
narios rely on implausible assumptions, and that models can-
not provide the attribution of effects needed to govern SRM in
practice. Yet IPCC reliance on modelling science means that
model studies as a future practices could have ‘lasting effect in
and for the future’ (Esguerra, 2019) beyond providing hypo-
thetical projections to inform political debate.2. Modellers’
ideas of how modelling could support governance and work-
arounds for the attribution problem are equally questionable.
‘Liability rules’ would in turn be embedded in a morass of
power relations and cultural debate over corporate and state
liability. And ‘compensation for side-effects’ is not only implau-
sible in a world where loss and damage provisions can’t be
agreed for climate change itself, and agreed funding for adap-
tation andmitigation in the global South lags behind promises;
but also largely fails to deal with the underlying problem:
demands for compensation necessarily reopen questions of
attribution. Repeatedly we see governance for geoengineering
hitting the same sort of obstacles that have hampered negotia-
tions onmitigation/adaptation for decades.
It’s not the timing – a pragmatist geofuture is not a
compromise
Concerns over timing also became an argument against the
resolution. For one opponent: ‘It is premature to put geo-
engineering into a UNEA resolution’ (NC:3) implying that
knowledge and understanding was too limited – even as
that shortfall was what the resolution purported to help
remedy. For another the argument was expressed as: ‘There
is no rush. It’s clear that [SAI] isn’t ready to deploy, not at
the stage where it could be indemnified against lawsuits or
prosecution’ (NH:9). But with the understanding revealed by
contesting geofutures and outlined above, the idea that a
study on geoengineering might be ‘premature’ appears in a
different light. SRM arguably might be deployed in a world
facing more severe climate impacts. But such a world is
likely to be one less capable of agreeing governance rules
(Howard and Livermore, 2019). In such circumstances, the
idea of governance delivering forms of geoengineering that
reflect global welfare functions through calibrated and tar-
geted interventions is very hard to sustain. Any delay in
seeking governance seems more likely to condemn the
effort to failure, and meanwhile delay enables further con-
solidation of the idealised geoengineering geofuture –which
risks providing a further reason for delay in urgently needed
mitigation.
In this light, the pragmatist geofuture should not be seen
as some form of ‘compromise’ between the idealised and
the situated. Rather it holds within it the potential for a dis-
tinctive and productive approach rooted in new approaches
to action. In this context the right outcome is not guaran-
teed by a particular process in a particular venue, but rather
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through an ongoing engagement with the political, eco-
nomic and cultural problems at the root of climate change,
and a move away from a ‘solutionist’ understanding of cli-
mate as something ultimately solvable (Hulme, 2009).
By definition such governance engagements would be
more diverse and participatory, not only at the procedural
level, but also in terms of the knowledge and understanding
involved. At the UNEA meeting, contestation around knowl-
edge was not just over the interpretation of models and sci-
entific findings (although conflicts continue). We also saw,
critically, demands for different forms of knowledge and cul-
tures of precaution on how knowledge about geoengineer-
ing should be (safely) generated, and discussed. Sound
science was repeatedly cited by opponents of the resolu-
tion. By contrast some supporters insisted on language that
endorsed ‘science and other knowledges’ and argued that
diverse actors and knowledges are essential to come to a
balanced evaluation of geoengineering technologies. When
asked for real-world expectations, even modellers rapidly
depart from idealised projections and anticipate conflict
over localised or regional efforts to geoengineer.
Pragmatist geofutures generate very different visions of
who gets to shape the critical future practices of geoengi-
neering. Instead of the IPCC feeding into existing politics of
climate change – and its history of repeated delay and pre-
varication (McLaren and Markusson, 2020), the UNEA poten-
tially opens up opportunities to new groups and interests,
notably the most vulnerable and disadvantaged. The choice
of venue is in turn a contribution to reconfigured processes
of world-making, because decisions on which multilateral
systems get reinforced and which get weakened in turn
reinforce or remake the political realities of the world.
Conclusions
Despite the failure to agree first steps at UNEA, there is
good reason to believe that CDR geoengineering at least
may be required to avoid devastating climate change, given
the ongoing shortcomings of mitigation policies (IPCC,
2018). But our analysis suggests that global scale geoengi-
neering may even be more difficult to negotiate than miti-
gation, and hence truth-claims made under the global
planner/governance assumption should not be carried over
into feasibility and policy debates. The analysis also suggests
that the quest for a pragmatic climate policy begins with
finding a new configuration of negotiations rooted in a situ-
ated understanding of the problems we face.
In this respect the UNEA negotiations (despite the failure
of the resolution) successfully raised the profile of geoengi-
neering, and awareness of the complexities implied in seek-
ing to govern it. Indeed the negotiations (as analysed here)
exposed that such difficulties go beyond the challenge of
rational actors designing appropriate institutions. Our analy-
sis also demonstrates that reasons advanced at and after
Nairobi to explain resistance to the geoengineering resolu-
tion should not be taken at face value. The clashing geofu-
tures, (re)produced variously through future practices
(models, scenarios, policy texts, negotiations, campaigns and
more), and outlined above illustrate that questions of venue,
timing and definition were an expression of – rather than
the cause of – disagreement in an uneven world. The under-
lying challenge comes from fundamental differences on
truth-making, world-making and action-making, exacerbated
by the coexistence of multiple, uneven societies, and the
belief of all participants that their position offers the more
valid representation of reality.
The idealised position adopts a technocratic, road-mapping
approach to the future (using models as predictions), which
fares particularly badly when exposed to international com-
plexities. Posing as abstract objectivism with rationalist institu-
tionalism as ‘governance’, the imaginaries of the idealised
position could in practice only be materialised through the de
facto exercise of epistemic, ontological and procedural power.
Governance based on the idealised view would be deployed
(or omitted) in ways that align with interests of its proponents
– keeping geoengineering available to those most likely to
have the capability to develop it, including as a means to
delay emissions mitigation otherwise politically or economi-
cally disruptive to them. The situated position rejects the ide-
alised geofuture and its forms of truth-making in a critique of
historical and structural inequality and suggests a route to the
future based in bottom-up struggle for transformation. This
too struggles to deliver practical tools when exposed to the
realities of the international. Yet the understanding of climate
and responses to it as – at least in part – a situated product
of the politics of the international, should warn us against rely-
ing too heavily on future objects (technologies, models, etc.)
that draw a globalist veil over historic and international con-
flicts (Corry, 2017a; McLaren, 2016a). The pragmatist position
offers an opportunity to utilise models as projections only,
and to build multiple scenarios which respect some situated
insights into power and technology. It promises to deliver
action-making to reconfigure institutions of governance in
necessary and functional ways but has less of a grasp of the
politics necessary to get there, stopping short of questioning
the role (prospective) technologies play in maintaining a world
order that might ultimately negate that governance agenda.
The diverging world-making views reflected in the debate
confirm that the challenges of governing geoengineering
are at least as bound up with ideas of justice, participation
and historic exploitation as mitigation and adaptation policy
have proven to be. This case of geoengineering negotiation
is specific in its set of actors and the ostensible points of
contention. However, in the context of the wider history of
environmental struggle and climate politics, it offers broader
insights into the interactions of states and groupings (be-
yond standard political theory), especially in the face of the
growing material constraints of environmental impacts and
scarcity. Climate governance as a whole needs to embrace
history, politics and the international if it is to bridge the
gaping ‘mismatch between rhetoric, intentions and action’
(Stevenson, 2020, p. 1). The idealist and situated worldviews
are in deep conflict, and as seen here, pragmatist attempts
to establish compromise are not enough when the idealist
position is co-evolved with dominant geopolitical institu-
tional regimes, and adopted by some actors to serve vested
© 2021 The Authors. Global Policy published by Durham University and John Wiley & Sons Ltd. Global Policy (2021)
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interests. In this context some of Jinnah and Nicholson’s
(2019) suggestions (broadening the IPCC’s assessment role,
more sharing of information, more attention to distributional
implications; generation of more diverse knowledge) may
appear desirable, but could not be expected to generate
agreement on governance. There are no simple procedural
solutions here, but given existing power structures, to gen-
erate climate governance that is both pragmatic and situ-
ated, we see more prospects in keeping geoengineering out
of the IPCC/UNFCCC, while perhaps calling the bluff of the
idealised on the questions of timing and definitions, with
two separate, sequenced assessments of CDR and SRM gov-
ernance. Critically, such a process, with the ‘world-making’
power such assessments embody, would further expose the
underlying motives of any states seeking to use geoengineering
as a cover for continued extractivism and fossil consumption,
while allowing those willing to explore geoengineering gover-
nance to debate the extent of any regulation and constraints,
including the measures needed to avoid any substitution of geo-
engineering for feasible emissions reductions. In an open clash
of geofutures, we see not only new sources of conflict and a reac-
tivation of familiar struggles, but also the possibility of a new
planetary order that could respond to both international inequal-
ities and the global scale of human impact on natural systems.
Notes
1.. Initial negotiating text available at https://papersmart.unon.org/reso
lution/uploads/switzerland_-_resolution_submission_-_geoengineer
ing_and_its_governance_-_unea_4_.pdf
2.. There are parallels here with how economic models – despite their
shortcomings - are used in economic policy, though the frequency
of crashes, and failed predictions should give us pause for thought
before applying such an approach to the world’s climate.
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